Ukraine

[CharlesHarris]

This link certainly illustrates some training shortfalls for the RU formations. It shows that the Russian bear is not up to competing with a peer force.

https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2022/...ls/362911/

Not at all trusting US media on this one. Not reliable. I am balancing US media with RU and IS reporting. The truth is somewhere in the middle. At least the Russians aren’t using images from video games or Syria in their propaganda. Sure can’t say the same for NBC and CNN.

RU plan is solid for that familiar terrain. Big muscle moves are about right. But their unit performance is what I would expect: slower than anticipated and more supply troubles than planned for. That’s the nature of large formations. Russia hasn’t done them for quite a while, and certainly not against modern armor and anti-armor missiles. The Javelin is a thing of beauty when properly employed. Burdensome to carry, but awesome in effect.

Russia suffers dreadfully from their 12 month conscription policy. They have no professional NCO corps to speak of. That’s a real problem in the close fight. Long service NCOs will make or break a battalion. That’s one strength of the US and Brit armies. NATO NCOs are well trained, proficient, and given great latitude to get things done.

Russia is an artillery based army. Fires fix and suppress enemy positions for destruction by ground maneuver, which really means massed machinegun fire. It’s not elegant, but it works. Until yesterday RU had been avoiding excessive use of indirect fires. Probably to spare infrastructure and civilian casualties. Selected sites were destroyed deliberately, like bio research facilities funded by the US and airfields that RU doesn’t plan to use immediately. Cities are bypassed for the most part, and isolated siege style. Some fighting on the outskirts but no meaningful thunder runs downtown.

West of Dnieper things are different now. Ukraine is setting effective anti armor ambushes and integrating mortars with the Javelins. A good tactic for mobile defense. That’s slowing the RU advance and causing a lot of casualties for RU. En and vehicles. The gloves seem to have come off in many areas. RU is using a lot more artillery suppression and brought in armed drones. It’s going to get ugly before it’s over.

Russian logistics problems aren’t unreasonable even for a professional army. Don’t make too much of reports that they’re out of (whatever) supply. Corps have an offensive operational depth of about 350 km. Moving that requires a lot of coordination that usually gets messed up even when things are going well. Tactical pauses are a common remedy while the log trains get sorted and divisional log bases leapfrog to new positions. It’s not sexy and most armies aren’t good at it. The US army places great emphasis on logistics movement and control. But we still screw it up when weather gets marginal and the enemy gets ambitious.

These problems get more pronounced at battalion task force level. A battalion carries enough supply for 12-24 hours of offensive movement in contact. That’s not a lot. Lose a few fuel trucks to mud, tired or inexperienced drivers, or enemy action and you’re going to have trouble. Ditto for ammo trucks. Tank and artillery munitions don’t fit in your pocket, and they get used rapidly when a battalion is decisively engaged. Many, many trucks circulating around the battlefield to make all that work. It’s hard to keep that dance moving smoothly. When I did this stuff for a living, I paid most attention to the intel folks, the logisticians, and air defenders. Those are all critical, but low density, assets. Artillery and armor are plentiful by comparison.

Ukraine made a big mistake defending forward. Terrain is bad in the east. They seem to have gotten cut off in a salient. It will be hard to break out of that. Harder if they have to force a river crossing. That’s why Zelensky is hollering for aircraft: they really need the mobile fires delivery systems to help with that breakout.

RU air force has mostly been absent from the tactical fight. Not sure why they would make that choice. RU doesn’t have a big fixed wing CAS or air supremacy force. Maybe they’re saving it for later? Hard to say.

Interdicting rocket artillery is a standard battle drill. Counter fire radars and SIGINT are used to locate the firing batteries. That’s supplemented with UAV or other imagery platform to confirm location prior to delivering counter battery fires from cannon, rocket, or aircraft. It’s not difficult if you practice and have a tolerance for collateral civilian damage. So, the US can help with the targeting process by sharing near real time intel. A more hands on approach by the US would be an undeniable declaration of war. Can’t really send Ukraine equipment they’re not trained to use, so sending radars and MLRS is a forlorn hope unless the crews go along with the kit. In for a penny, in for a pound.

In addition to targeting support, we could help Ukraine with intercepting and jamming RU tactical comms. Both Ukraine and RU are emitting way too much in low VHF and high HF bands. We could help them with some basic equipment that’s fairly easy to operate. Not decisive by any means, but quite useful.

It’s a gigantic mess we’re facing. Either we get involved or we stay out of it. Half measures do more harm than good. Sending more ODAs and private contractors is going to bite us if we’re not very careful.

Related, sort of. The unintended consequences of sanctions aren’t going to be pleasant for US. We aren’t thinking this stuff through very well, nor are we accounting for the dynamic learning that occurs in conflict. The effects are going to be with us for a very long time as the world learns to work around SWIFT and designates alternative reserve currencies. The supply chain impacts are equally as damaging in the short and mid terms.